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The Urban Material Politics of Decarbonization  
in Stockholm, London and San Francisco 
Laura Tozer, Durham University1 
Abstract 
This paper examines the implementation of carbon governance initiatives targeting urban buildings and 
energy infrastructure and uses a material politics approach to evaluate whether these practices are 
triggering trajectories towards decarbonization. Urban low carbon transitions suggest a substantial re-
ordering of urban infrastructure. However, there is a critical need to engage with the material implications 
of low carbon practices since research so far has painted a picture of incremental ambitions struggling in 
implementation. This paper interrogates how carbon governance is implemented through urban buildings 
and energy systems, and the implications for urban decarbonization, by drawing on three urban case 
studies: Stockholm, London and San Francisco. The analysis draws on interviews with representatives 
from government, industry, utilities, building owners, and non-governmental organizations who are 
striving to achieve decarbonization in their cities. Patterns are emerging in what is being made to matter 
politically through the translation of carbon governance into building-energy infrastructure. In particular, 
the paper finds that 1) a short-term decision making timeline encourages action that incrementally reduces 
greenhouse gas emissions without fundamentally overcoming carbon lock-in, 2) actors are harnessing 
exceptional urban space to overcome the tyranny of cost-effectiveness in maintaining fossil fuel 
entrenchment (with concerning implications for justice and uneven development), 3) there is a pattern of 
individualization of responsibility for decarbonization, and 4) material politics are limiting the application 
of low carbon retrofits for the existing built form. Overall, this paper examines the implementation of 




Urban decarbonization requires sweeping transformation to not only urban political and 
institutional systems, but also the material infrastructures supporting urban life (Bulkeley, Castán 
Broto, & Maassen, 2011). The enormous scope of the challenge and opportunity for urban low 
carbon transition is alternately staggering and galvanizing. Despite widespread and growing 
adoption of local goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, however, urban climate change 
mitigation action has taken a piecemeal rather than systemic approach (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2007; 
Bulkeley & Betsill, 2013; Reckien et al., 2014; Romero-Lankao, 2012). Furthermore, actors are 
explicitly experimenting with low-carbon practices that are uncertain both in terms of successful 
implementation and actual impact on urban greenhouse gas emissions (Castán Broto & Bulkeley, 
                                               




2013). Some municipal governments have even started to aim for what they call "deep 
decarbonization" (Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance, 2015), which specifically targets urban 
transformation. Urban climate response is also multi-scalar involving diverse actors beyond the 
local government (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2013; Emelianoff, 2014; Peng & Bai, 2018). While there 
is a great deal of urban decarbonization activity underway, it is not clear what all of this activity 
might amount to when it comes to re-making the socio-material fabric of urban areas since action 
has been incremental, experimental and multi-scalar. This paper engages with the material 
implications of low carbon practices in cities to offer new insights into whether and how 
decarbonization efforts are reconfiguring urban buildings and energy infrastructure (Bulkeley, 
Castan Broto, & Edwards, 2015; Hodson, Burrai, & Barlow, 2016; Lovell, Bulkeley, & Owens, 
2009; Rutherford, 2014). Urban actors are governing carbon in many ways, but buildings are a 
substantial target for low carbon action and therefore offer a useful entry point into processes of 
urban decarbonization (Lovell, 2008; Castán Broto & Bulkeley, 2013; Edwards & Bulkeley, 
2017). 
The aim of this paper is to interrogate how carbon governance is accomplished through urban 
buildings and energy systems, and the implications for urban decarbonization trajectories, by 
drawing on three urban case studies: Stockholm, London and San Francisco. To do so, I delve 
into the material politics of implemented carbon governance efforts in cities. I focus on buildings 
and energy as an interconnected urban infrastructure to understand decarbonization practices. 
This approach allows me to evaluate whether carbon governance is triggering urban 
decarbonization, while still encompassing the messy, materially embedded, and contested nature 
of infrastructure transformations.  
This paper examines the slice of urban carbon governance purportedly aiming for transformative 
decarbonization to provide a novel deepening of our understanding of urban carbon governance. 
Decarbonization is the reversal of the entrenchment of fossil-fuel energy systems that has 
resulted from the co-evolution of technological and institutional systems in industrial economies 
or “carbon lock-in” (Unruh, 2000). One way to understand these transformations is to use a 
material politics approach to analyze how the city is reconfigured as carbon governance unfolds 
and the politics of assembling together particular human and non-human elements, but not others 




order to learn through comparison, which complements work in this vein that has largely focused 
on a tracing the material politics of energy transition interventions within a city (Bulkeley, 
McGuirk, & Dowling, 2016; Rutherford, 2014; Silver, 2017). 
More specifically, I examine the patterns emerging through decarbonization practices and use a 
material politics approach to analyze which aspects of urban materiality come to matter as 
carbon governance is translated into building-energy infrastructure. There is variation in what is 
made to matter since carbon management is an idea that can be variously deployed to make 
different things into problems and solutions. I argue that emerging patterns in urban 
decarbonization practices carry implications for whether or not cities are on trajectories toward 
decarbonization. In particular, I find that: a short-term decision making timeline encourages 
action that incrementally reduces greenhouse gas emissions without fundamentally overcoming 
carbon lock-in; new urban space is moving toward decarbonization, especially when actor 
harness exceptional urban space to overcome the tyranny of cost-effectiveness in maintaining 
fossil fuel entrenchment, but this introduces concerning implications for justice and uneven 
development; there is a pattern of individualization of responsibility for decarbonization that is 
limiting the potential scope of urban transformation; and material politics are limiting the 
application of low carbon retrofits for the existing built form. 
2. Material Politics of Urban Infrastructure 
In order to examine the re-ordering of the city as low carbon transitions unfold, one can pay 
greater attention to the material politics of urban infrastructure. Work in this area sees urban 
infrastructure as dynamic, contested, and socio-political as much as technical (Hodson & 
Marvin, 2009; Kaika & Swyngedouw, 2000; McFarlane & Rutherford, 2008; Monstadt, 2009; 
Rutherford & Coutard, 2014). This is related to an interest in materiality - a more-than-human 
approach (Whatmore, 2006) - that has revived more broadly across geography. Important here is 
that materials are not a background on which human controversies play out. Decarbonization 
cannot be rolled out through an obliging set of technologies, policies and practices. Instead, 
politics is wrapped up with materials in a diverse range of socio-material assemblages. The 





A material politics approach to urban low carbon transition considers the ways in which urban 
politics and materialities come to matter as transitions unfold (Bulkeley et al., 2016; Rutherford, 
2014). Drawing on Barry’s work on the “material politics” of pipelines (Barry, 2013), recent 
work has used this approach to examine urban energy transitions in response to an overemphasis 
on policy representations in climate governance literature (Rutherford, 2014; Bulkeley et al., 
2016). Using ideas of relational materiality, this approach considers the co-production of 
materiality through the assemblages of human and non-human elements (Latham et al., 2009). 
Assembling is an inherently political process and “the political significance of materials is not a 
given; rather, it is a relational, a practical and a contingent achievement” (Barry, 2013). Some 
scholars have examined the ways that objects matter politically to consider the relationships 
between people and objects and the ways that objects are invested with normative and 
performative powers (Marres, 2012; Meehan, Shaw, & Marston, 2013; Shaw & Meehan, 2013). 
Other scholars draw on Foucault to structure their analyses of relational materiality (see Bulkeley 
et al., 2016), who argued that governing is not just concerned with the social world of actors and 
institutions, but is made up of a “complex of men and things” (Foucault, 2009). This means that 
governing involves the assemblage of different elements together and a configuration of power 
through people and things (McGuirk, Bulkeley, & Dowling, 2015). Overall, relational 
approaches to materiality foreground the material, but, importantly, also consider all of the 
relations the material represents.  
I draw on these relational approaches to materiality that consider the ways that human/non-
human as well as material/immaterial elements are drawn together and driven apart through the 
processes of urban circulation. I follow the idea of materiality defined as “a spatio-temporal 
process in which the more tangible, physical stuff of the city is a lively participant” (Latham et 
al., 2009, p. 62, original emphasis). Rather than arguing that the materiality of places or the 
agency of objects determines both the path the city will take and the politics of decarbonization, I 
instead examine the interaction of human and non-human as decarbonization is assembled 
together. Assembling the elements of carbon governance is “an inherently political process” 
(Rutherford, 2018) because it necessarily represents particular interests and highlights some 




In particular, I answer the following questions: As carbon governance is translated into building-
energy infrastructure, what is it about urban materiality that comes to matter? What are the 
implications for urban decarbonization pathways? Following the application of Rutherford 
(2014), I focus on the relations between people and objects, particularly by considering what is 
made visible, tangible or durable through practices of ordering, circulation or manipulation. In 
this way, one can consider how things come to matter by considering how energy transitions are 
governed, including the acts of formulation, implementation and contestation made visible 
through artefacts, techniques and practices (Bulkeley et al., 2016). The focus is not on which 
specific objects come to matter, but, instead, on the ways in which materiality is “present in the 
connections between things, technologies, people, bodies, signs, texts, etc. with none of these as 
inherently more material or immaterial than the others” (Rutherford, 2014). Relational lenses, 
such as time, space or agency, open up opportunities to look beyond urban objects. A material 
politics approach to analyze the implementation of decarbonization also ensures that the socio-
material form that is taken as carbon governance is negotiated and adapted to urban contexts is 
neither tuned out nor attributed to settled readings of power relations (Bulkeley et al., 2016). 
Therefore, this approach allows me to maintain the complexity of urban infrastructure transitions 
while still considering the broader implications of patterns in decarbonization practice that affect 
whether or not cities are headed toward decarbonization trajectories.  
Scholars interested in infrastructures have tended to focus their analyses on infrastructures other 
than buildings. Urban political ecology, for example, has often focused on water provision and 
science and technology studies has tended to focused on large technical systems (Monstadt, 
2009). While there has been interest among scholars in urban energy infrastructure, there has 
been limited work on buildings as infrastructure (with notable exceptions, for example see 
Edwards & Bulkeley (2017)). There has, however, been research into the various ways that 
buildings are a focal point for the performance of low carbon cities. In particular, see Lovell’s 
work on zero carbon homes (2007) and Marres’ work on eco-homes (2008).  
In this paper, I argue buildings and energy are best understood as an interconnected urban 
infrastructure since they are spatially and conceptually paired in urban decarbonization practice. 
The mutual influence of building characteristics and energy in decarbonization can be illustrated 




industry (factories) or city services (sewage waste heat recovery), but buildings must be designed 
in specific ways to be able to effectively make use of this low temperature heat. Second, 
investments in energy efficiency retrofits are often rationalized as the cheapest form of energy 
’supply’ as opposed to constructing new energy generation facilities to meet demand. In this 
way, building retrofits conceptually become energy supply. Given these conceptual and spatial 
pairings, it is more productive to conceptualize the building-energy nexus as an urban 
infrastructure than as separate sectors in order to draw on approaches that emphasize urban flows 
and the socio-material co-production of urban materiality. This approach makes it easier to see 
the ways that carbon governance is socio-materially assembled through low carbon interventions 
in the urban.  
3. Research Methods 
I focused on carbon governance of buildings related to three urban case studies: Stockholm, 
London and San Francisco. I chose the cases based on three criteria: international leadership in 
carbon governance, heterogeneity within that leadership group, and evidence of leadership in 
building decarbonization. The first criterion was membership in the Carbon Neutral Cities 
Alliance (CNCA), a transnational municipal climate governance network founded in 2014 by 
local governments in wealthy, industrialized countries. The network is made up of local 
governments that are, in their own words, adopting “the most aggressive GHG reduction targets 
undertaken by any cities across the globe” (Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance, 2015:p.ii). The 
CNCA has a geographic bias in membership towards North America and Europe (see Table 1), 
but this limited geographic scope is important to study because, as self-identified pioneers of 
urban “deep decarbonization” (Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance, 2015), the founding members of 
the CNCA are defining what it means for a city to become carbon neutral. Second, within the 
restricted scope of the CNCA, I selected cities that are as different from each other as possible in 
terms of demographics, climate, urban form and institutional setting (e.g. regulatory strength of 
municipal government, alignment with national climate policies). The third criterion for case 
study selection was the presence of urban carbon governance of buildings. Strategies aimed at 
buildings to both improve energy efficiency and decarbonize energy sources are prevalent, but 
there are also a number of other situation-specific strategies used by urban actors (Kennedy, 




entry point into urban processes of decarbonization, I looked for the presence of carbon 
governance of buildings over at least a 5 year time period during documentary analysis, which I 
assumed was a long enough time period for some implementation to have unfolded.  
My use of the case study approach is not intended to be a comparison between the cities to find 
causal factors. Instead, it is an interpretive approach to theorization of urban decarbonization 
drawing on data from three urban contexts. This approach draws on a key advantage of 
comparative studies, which is the opportunity to “generate and modify concepts and theory so 
that they explain commonalities across cases despite contingencies or context” (Baxter, 2010, 
emphasis in original). I draw on three different urban contexts to generate insight into 
commonalities in urban carbon governance practices and the implications for decarbonization 
pathways. 
Table 1 Members of the Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance (USDN, 2015)  
Berlin, Germany Minneapolis MN, USA Stockholm, Sweden 
Boston MA, USA New York City NY, USA Sydney, Australia 
Boulder CO, USA Oslo, Norway Vancouver, Canada 
Copenhagen, Denmark Portland OR, USA Washington DC, USA 
London, United Kingdom San Francisco CA, USA Yokohama, Japan 
Melbourne, Australia Seattle WA, USA   
The findings are based on semi-structured interviews, documentary analysis of relevant policy 
document and reports, and site visits to low carbon building and energy infrastructure. I 
conducted interviews with 40 representatives from the urban development industry (n=12), 
government (n=18), utilities (n=2), building owners (n=2) and non-governmental organizations 
(n=6) who were involved in building and energy decarbonization over five week field visits to 
each case study in 2016-2017. I conducted 11 interviews in Stockholm, 16 interviews in London, 
and 13 interviews in San Francisco. I interviewed a community of practitioners and policymakers 
striving to achieve decarbonization in their cities, whom I call decarbonization actors. Their 
efforts represents a political struggle against entrenched interests embodying pervasive carbon 




2016; Unruh, 2000). This community’s approach to decarbonization is also contested by other 
groups – such as grassroots organizations who push back on discourses of de-politicization and 
technocratic solutions – but that is outside the scope of this research. The interviews were 
transcribed and thematically coded. I also conducted 19 building tours and site visits, including 
in-depth and self-directed tours of buildings ranging from single-family homes to commercial 
buildings, as well as tours of urban energy infrastructure and site visits to eco-districts and 
neighbourhoods.  
4. Case Studies 
Case Study: Stockholm 
 The population of Stockholm is approximately 901,000. The City of Stockholm has a 
high degree of control over the built environment since it owns about 20% of the buildings in the 
city (City of Stockholm, 2012) and 70% of the land area. Local government agencies and 
buildings on city owned land are required to meet energy efficiency targets (see Table 2). Some 
policies and programs have sought to improve energy efficiency in private buildings in 
Stockholm, including demonstration projects for multi-family residential buildings, but generally 
these sectors have been difficult to reach. Stockholm is located in a colder climate and much of 
the energy load relates to heating. District heating meets 80% of Stockholm heating needs, which 
has been historically facilitated by the proliferation of communal residential buildings where 
owners have a share in the whole building (Dzebo & Nykvist, 2017). One key task of carbon 
governance is fuel switching to non-fossil fuels for district heating, such as biofuels and waste 
incineration. However, a reliance on incineration places a cap on progress towards 
decarbonization since about a third of the carbon in Swedish waste is from fossil-fuel sources 
(e.g. plastics) (Jones, Blomqvist, Bisaillon, Lindberg, & Hupa, 2013). Nonetheless, most city-
wide GHG emission reductions to date have been achieved due to this fuel switching. Solar PV 
installation is also taking place, particularly on municipally owned buildings. Stockholm has also 
designated the Hammarby Sjöstad and Stockholm Royal Seaport neighbourhoods as eco-
districts, where new developments are required to meet higher environmental standards.   




The population of San Francisco is approximately 860,000. San Francisco has a mild climate, 
which results in a lower heating and cooling load compared to the other two cases. GHG 
emissions city-wide have decreased (see Table 2), primarily due increased renewable energy 
because of the California’s Renewables Portfolio Standard and the closure of two fossil fuel 
plants in San Francisco (San Francisco, 2013). San Francisco has had a Green Building Code 
since 2008 requiring energy efficient new and majorly retrofitted buildings linked to the LEED 
and GreenPoint Rated green building rating systems. California is also increasing energy 
efficiency levels through the building code to meet Net Zero Energy targets. The City of San 
Francisco requires that buildings over 10,000 sq ft must benchmark their energy use and conduct 
an energy audit. Some private building energy efficiency retrofits are taking place due to the 
combined impact of San Francisco and California’s energy efficiency policies and programs, 
including Energy Upgrade which connects homeowners with energy efficiency incentives 
offered by their local government and utilities and Energy Watch which offers energy efficiency 
services and financial incentives to businesses, contractors, and apartment building owners. In 
2016, electricity customers in San Francisco began to be automatically transitioned to the 
municipally owned utility program CleanPowerSF, which sells customers electricity 
incorporating a higher percentage of renewable energy at the same cost as the electricity that 
they were previously sold from the investor-owned utility. 
4.3 London 
The Greater London Authority (GLA) has a population of about 8.6 million. While GHG 
reductions in London between 1990 and 2014 (see Table 2) can be partly attributed to building 
retrofits and changes in the transportation sector, much of these reductions are due to changes in 
energy supply, particularly reduced coal combustion nationally (Mayor of London, 2015). While 
heating and building efficiency have been key concerns, attention is also turning to the growing 
cooling load. Using planning tools, GLA sets both energy supply and efficiency requirements for 
large developments in London and also promotes the expansion of district heating using planning 
tools. Energy efficiency retrofits for existing buildings are promoted through a number of 
programs (see Table 2), which offer technical capacity and consulting services to building 
owners and managers. Other energy efficiency programs using loans or subsidies are also 




the national government. Decentralized and renewable energy development is also pursued by 
the boroughs. For example, the borough of Merton requires new developments to provide 10% of 
its energy use from on-site renewable energy generation (Merton Council, 2016). Renewable 
energy development is also being funded through community initiatives, including cooperatives 




Table 2 Selected Aspects of Case Study Governance Contexts 
 Local Authority Targets Larger Jurisdiction Context Indicators of Progress Key Policies and Programs 
Stockholm Fossil fuel free by 2030 for city 
operations and 2040 for the 
whole city 
Reduce per capita emissions to 
2.3 tons CO2eq/capita by 2020 
Halve the energy use of the 
existing building stock by 2050 
(from 1995 levels) 
(City of Stockholm, 2016) 
The Swedish Building Code requires 
a high degree of efficiency and the 
EU has directed members to achieve 
near zero energy in new buildings by 
2020 (Hermelink et al., 2013) 
Sweden’s goals are to reduce GHG 
emissions 40% from 1990 by 2020 
and no net GHG emissions by the 
year 2050 
Stockholm’s GHG emissions reduced 
approximately 56% between 1990-2016 
(C40 Cities, 2017) 
30% reduction (from 1995 levels) in 
energy use in existing building stock 
(City of Stockholm, 2016) 
Local government and agencies are 
required to reduce energy use by 
10% between 2016-2019 
New buildings on city-owned land 
required to meet a high energy 
efficiency standard (max 55kWh/m2)  





100% renewables goal: by 
2030, residential electricity is 
planned to come from 
renewable sources and 80% of 
commercial electricity use is 
planned to come from 
renewable sources (City of San 
Francisco, 2013) 
Increased renewable energy because 
of the California’s Renewables 
Portfolio Standard (San Francisco, 
2013) 
California building code targets: new 
residential buildings to be Zero Net 
Energy by 2020, commercial 
buildings in 2030 
California Global Warming Solutions 
Act (2006): reduce GHG emissions to 
1990 levels by 2020 
San Francisco’s GHG emissions city-
wide decreased 14.5% between 1990 and 
2010 (San Francisco, 2013) 
7.9% reduction in energy use among 
commercial properties that regularly 
comply with the Benchmarking 
Ordinance (SF Environment, 2015) 
San Francisco’s Green Building 
Code 
San Francisco’s Energy 
Benchmarking Ordinance for 
commercial buildings 
Renewable energy supply through 
CleanPowerSF 
Capacity building programs 
including Energy Upgrade and 
Energy Watch 
London GHG reduction target of 60% 
(below 1990 levels) by 2025 
(Mayor of London, 2016) 
Zero carbon city by 2050 
(Mayor of London, 2016) 
25% of the heat and power used 
in London to come from local 
decentralized systems by 2025 
(City of London, 2015) 
UK Climate Change Act: reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by at least 
80% of 1990 levels by 2050 
Reduced coal combustion in the UK 
(reduced GHG emissions for 
electricity) 
EU directive to achieve near zero 
energy in new buildings by 2020 
UK Zero Carbon Homes target by 
2016 (cancelled in 2015) 
London’s GHG emissions decreased 16% 
between 1990 and 2014 and per capita 
emissions estimated at 4.4 tonnes in 2014  
(Mayor of London, 2017) 
Average energy efficiency savings 30-
40% above national building code 
requirements since 2007 on large urban 
developments (City of London, 2015) 
Retrofits of 500,000 homes in London 
and 400 public sector buildings by 2014 
(Mayor of London, 2015) 
RE:FIT and RE:NEW GLA energy 
efficiency programs 
Energy Company Obligations for 
energy efficiency 
The London Plan energy 
requirements for large developments 





5. Practices of Decarbonization 
This section examines the patterns emerging through decarbonization practices and analyses 
which aspects of urban materiality come to matter as carbon governance is translated into 
building-energy infrastructure. Drawing from across the cases, I identify five key patterns: 1) 
decision-making timeframes and decarbonization deadlines, 2) spatial solutions and tensions for 
building-energy decarbonization, 3) exceptional urban space for learning and overcoming cost-
effectiveness, 4) responsibility for decarbonization and entrenched interests in energy supply, 
and 5) the struggle to retrofit the existing built environment. 
5.1 Decision-making timeframes and decarbonization 
deadlines 
The presence (or absence) of a long-term decarbonization frame influences the material shape of 
energy and building decisions made today. For example, the Greater London Authority mapped 
heat and energy demand for large urban developments while considering goals and predictions 
up to the year 2030. Since the study considered cost effectiveness and the characteristics of the 
broader electricity grid in addition to decarbonization goals, it found that “within that 
timeframe…gas-fired [combined heat and power plants]” for district energy made the most sense 
(Greater London Authority environment department employee, interview, Sept 8 2015). Natural 
gas powered district energy gained salience in London as a central plank in the GLA’s low 
carbon policies. More recently, work done by the GLA has recognized that when 2050 
decarbonization goals are also considered, this new district energy network will need to 
transition again away from natural gas in the not too distant future. However, the material 
characteristics of a district energy system must be quite different in order for it to use natural or 
waste heat sources to replace natural gas, including different locations for pipes and different 
building design (Greater London Authority environmental department employee, interview, Sept 
8 2015; London development industry representative, interview, Sept 15 2015). Summing up this 





“We’ve got a grid carbon emission factor. So when you do the math for 
a new flat, gas wins every time because it’s about 40% less carbon 
intensity that you get from electricity. But that’s only today. We know 
that we’re involved in a massive, massive political consensus to reduce 
our grid carbon emissions factor. Surely we should be thinking about 
that.  It’s like…our left arm is planning for this glorious future and the 
right arm is going ‘Let’s pretend that’s not happening’.”  
(London development industry representative, interview, Sept 15 2015) 
While natural gas might provide a marginal reduction in greenhouse gas emissions over the short 
term, in the long term natural gas expansion represents material entrenchment in fossil fuels that 
is incompatible with 2050 decarbonization goals. When working within a short-term frame, 
decarbonization actors identified different problems to solve compared to a long-term frame, 
which results in different building and energy infrastructure in practice.  
Urban actors are starting to put deadlines on decarbonization (e.g. all new homes to be carbon 
neutral by 2016 in the UK, all new homes to be zero net energy by 2020 in California, or fossil 
fuel free by 2040 in Stockholm) in addition to more familiar incremental greenhouse gas 
emission reduction targets (e.g. 20% GHG reduction by 2020). Whether because a larger policy 
framework makes it seem inevitable or because decarbonization goals become normal for a 
jurisdiction, the adoption of specific timelines often allowed decarbonization actors to refocus 
the discussion on how to implement decarbonization rather than when to do it. For example, in 
California, one research participant described how setting big, bold energy efficiency targets for 
the state was about “saying this is where we think we need to go, let’s figure out how to get there 
rather than spending our time on the goal setting part”, which “has been extremely valuable” 
(City of San Francisco environment department official, interview, Apr 14 2016). The same 
dynamic is taking place in Stockholm, where public housing companies understand that “you 
can’t really say, no we aren’t going to fulfill those [targets]. We have to…it’s a fact” (Stockholm 
development industry representative, interview, Nov 23 2015) and the discussion has turned to 
creating plans and measuring progress. Of course, the existence of a target linked to a timeline 
does not guarantee success. In the UK, the Zero Carbon Homes goal was abandoned right before 
the deadline despite an EU directive pushing the UK in the same direction. In addition, 
California is not going to meet its goal to retrofit half of all existing buildings to ZNE by 2030 




Nonetheless, a sense of inevitability about decarbonization can be used to shape current urban 
buildings and energy infrastructure implementation. The Greater London Authority could use the 
UK’s zero carbon homes goal policy framework as “an extra stick”, for example, where they 
“could point to the direction of travel and say well you’re going to have to get there anyway” 
(London consultant and former GLA employee, interview, Oct 5 2015) to support the GLA’s 
requirements for large urban developments to meet a slightly more ambitious trajectory. 
Temporal boundaries for decarbonization (not just marginal improvement) can be incorporated 
into an assumed trajectory for urban infrastructure development that decarbonization actors can 
leverage to shape current decision-making. 
5.2 Spatial solutions and tensions for building-energy 
decarbonization 
Across the case studies, the spatial approach to decarbonization took two formats: a district-
oriented approach or self-sufficient building approach. In the district-oriented approach, chunks 
of the city are conceptually and materially linked together and made more efficient while being 
supplied by lower carbon energy sources. In London, for example, new developments are 
“obligated, if they’re appropriate for district CHP, to go ahead with it” (London consultant and 
former GLA employee, interview, Oct 5 2015). The thinking is that this new infrastructure 
would provide some flexibility for London to enable decarbonization. As one GLA employee 
described, the idea is to “get a heat network up and running and then you can look at supplying it 
in different ways with fuels… Whereas at the moment we don’t even have that option…we’re 
just tied into a gas grid and a power grid. At least it would give us a little bit of flexibility to 
transition at some point in the future” (Greater London Authority environment department 
employee, interview, Sept 8 2015). For this format, decarbonization actors stressed the 
importance of networks of new or refurbished infrastructure linking together buildings. 
Stockholm heating and electricity supply has been configured using a district energy approach 
for decades, but renewable fuels have gradually replaced fossil fuels in district heating, 
notwithstanding one large coal-fired heat and power plant remaining in Värtan (City of 
Stockholm, 2016). Stockholm has also concentrated decarbonization efforts on eco-districts, 




urban circles for the degree of decarbonization enabled by district configurations and, as a result, 
other cities are copying the district approach.  
When pursuing a building-oriented decarbonization format, decarbonization actors largely treat 
each building as an island in the effort to enhance each building’s decarbonized self-sufficiency. 
For years, San Francisco has had a building code that has required developers to achieve a higher 
standard for energy efficiency and renewable energy than the statewide building code. In this 
approach, the building code is harnessed to try to decarbonize the city one new or majorly altered 
building at a time. Recently, building code updates have been reoriented to work towards 
achieving California’s target for all new buildings to be Zero Net Energy (ZNE) by 2030. San 
Francisco stakeholders have been involved in discussions about “what a ZNE code actually looks 
like” particularly concerning how much solar electricity can be generated on-site to offset the 
building’s energy use (San Francisco environmental NGO employee, interview, Apr 20 2016). In 
a similar demonstration of a building-oriented approach, a planning rule was adopted by the 
London borough of Merton that stated that 10% of a new building’s energy use must be 
produced using on-site renewable energy. The Merton Rule was influential and not only spread 
widely among other London boroughs, but was also adopted by the Greater London Authority 
(Merton Council, 2016). When buildings are targeted individually, each building is approached 
as a node and decarbonization actors design building-energy solutions to decarbonize that node. 
There is some contestation within the decarbonization actor community about which format is 
better. People have criticized the self-sufficient buildings approach for a lack of interconnectivity 
between buildings and a perceived failure to capture the benefits of a systems approach to 
energy. For instance, one participant in the research highlighted the Merton Rule in London 
specifically: 
“I think one of the most damaging aspect or policy was something 
called the Merton rule whereby we looked at one building and said that 
building is going to be sustainable and then you’d spend money on 
making that building be self-sufficient where actually what you need – 
a more cost effective way of doing it was to have a community based 
approach.”  




This participant in the research argued that a focus on individual buildings overlooked the 
opportunities for district energy solutions, particularly from a cost perspective. Another critique 
is the unintended side effects of a building-by-building approach. A not-for-profit has expressed 
concern that the ZNE target in California could encourage sprawl “since it might be harder to get 
a…building to be ZNE in a city where you don’t have space for on site renewables” (San 
Francisco environmental NGO employee, interview, Apr 20 2016). On the other hand, the 
district approach has been critiqued as too narrow in focus, which causes it to miss other kinds of 
low carbon opportunities better suited to individual buildings (e.g. heat pumps) (London 
development industry representative, interview, Sept 15 2015; London development industry 
representative, interview, Sept 7 2015). Different decarbonization actors take different 
approaches and so both kinds of spatial solutions are present to some extent in the urban case 
studies.  
5.3 Exceptional urban space for learning and overcoming 
cost-effectiveness 
In some cases, spaces within a city are cordoned off as exceptional decarbonization zones. This 
is the case in Stockholm, where one decarbonization strategy has been to build particular 
neighbourhoods to very high green standards. The Royal Seaport is a large area of urban land 
undergoing brownfield redevelopment from port lands to mixed used/residential developments. 
The city owns the land, and places a number of environmental requirements into the 
development agreements, including meeting a high energy efficiency standard. In many ways, 
City of Stockholm decarbonization actors see the Royal Seaport as “a test bed for many new 
things which then should be generalized and put into ordinary projects” (City of Stockholm 
planning administration employee, interview, Nov 5 2015). Decarbonization actors also position 
municipal buildings in San Francisco as exceptional space since publicly owned buildings must 
meet higher standards than the Green Building code, including LEED Gold certification. In San 
Francisco, the public mandate of the local government means that they are willing to spend 
money on more experimental technologies to achieve additional public good goals (in this case, 
decarbonization). In the case studies, exceptional spaces are used to facilitate learning and to 
build capacity in both the private and public sector, whether it is related to cutting-edge efficient 




standards. The theory of change behind this approach draws on niche theory, which explores 
how learning happens in protected space and then scales up more broadly (Smith, Voß, & Grin, 
2010). That said, there are also concerns that the exceptional nature of these urban spaces makes 
the experiences incompatible with ordinary projects (Stockholm development industry 
representative, interview, Nov 24 2015). Many low carbon solutions are often considered to be 
too expensive without the added support of a public mandate or high value urban real estate.  
In addition to supporting learning, the exceptional nature of urban space provides a venue to 
overcome the tyranny of cost effectiveness in maintaining the status quo. In general across the 
three cases, urban decarbonization was pursued only as far as was ‘cost effective’ under a 
particular paradigm, usually using logics development under fossil fuel entrenchment. For 
example, the measure of cost-effectiveness for building codes in California uses a complicated 
metric called TDV (Time Dependent Valuation) that effectively prioritizes natural gas: 
“The purpose of the TDV metric…is to try to account for the time 
value, particularly of electricity use. But because of the way they came 
up with the numbers and just because of the difference in cost between 
electricity and gas, the electricity TDV values are much higher than the 
gas TDV values. Ranging from 3:1 at low use hours to like 100:1 at 
high use, peak summer hours for electricity. And because of that, if 
you’re comparing an electric appliance to a baseline of a gas appliance, 
it does not look good.”  
(San Francisco environmental NGO employee, interview, Apr 20 2016) 
Appliances like gas furnaces can be powered by electricity rather than fossil fuels in California 
to transition the energy system and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. However, as the previous 
quote explains, the metric used to measure cost-effectiveness works against this transition since 
the metric favours natural gas. Because the development of the metric was based on assumptions 
about a fossil fuel based energy system, cost-effectiveness is now linked to the perpetuation of 
fossil fuels. As this demonstrates, the fossil fuel entrenchment of the status quo can be 
perpetuated through requirements to meet ‘cost effectiveness’. 
One way decarbonization actors have addressed the tyranny of cost effectiveness has been by 
leveraging premium urban land to enable the first (and therefore more expensive) explorations 
into cutting edge decarbonization in practice. Many of these initiatives are concentrated in 




development despite having to meet higher environmental standards than the rest of the city (and 
country) because it is high value urban land. A similar dynamic takes place in London: “Because 
London is such a premium area to want to develop buildings, developers would sometimes go 
the extra mile or they would actually see the logic of [energy and carbon requirements]” (London 
consultant and former GLA employee, interview, Oct 5 2015). The GLA is able to require higher 
energy standards and participation in lower carbon energy generation schemes because of the 
high value of the real estate in large, central urban developments. Beyond central commercial 
areas, the city can be more broadly seen as an exceptional space compared to national or 
international context. Again, this exceptionality relates to disparities in real estate value: “In 
Stockholm it's really expensive to buy something also so I mean the builders will also make 
money even if they have sharper requirements on those buildings. Maybe not in smaller 
cities…but in Stockholm we don't have that problem….” (City of Stockholm politician, 
interview, Nov 27 2015). The experiences in cities may shift the market more broadly. In 
California, one participant noted that the adoption of ‘reach’ codes with higher energy efficiency 
standards “helps shift the market more and more in that direction which then enables future code 
additions at state level to increase” (San Francisco environmental NGO employee, interview, 
Apr 20 2016). Capacity building in the exceptional spaces within and across urban areas can 
enable decarbonization in broader jurisdictions. 
5.4 Responsibility for decarbonization and entrenched 
interests in energy supply 
One participant in the research memorably drew my attention to the “elephants and mosquitos” 
of decarbonization (City of Stockholm planning administration employee, interview, Nov 5 
2015). The elephants are large steps towards decarbonization (e.g. shutting down a coal plant) 
and the mosquitos are the small steps toward decarbonization (e.g. door to door home energy 
auditing). The participant has found that decarbonization actors often struggle to address the 
elephants and, as a result, spend too much time focusing on the mosquitos. Powerful entrenched 
fossil fuel interests are often the reason it is difficult to address the elephants of decarbonization. 
In Stockholm, multiple research participants identified the ‘elephant’ as a single combined heat 
and power plant in Värtan in the northeast of Stockholm that is fired by coal and biofuel. This 




2010). Its continued operation has been a political issue in Stockholm for many years 
(Rutherford, 2014) and continues to be a source of contention: 
"Fortum wants to run it for 10-15 years in the future because it is very 
cheap for them to use it. But the politicians said…that in 2020 they 
want that to be closed. But Fortum said “No, we can't do that”. So I will 
say now that the negotiations [to close it down] are landing in 
somewhere 2025 to 2028."  
(City of Stockholm environment administration employee, interview, 
Nov 10 2015) 
The coal plant was quasi-privatized between 1998 and 2002, but the City of Stockholm retains a 
50% influence through half the seats on the board (Rutherford, 2014). In recent years, the 
company that owns the plant, Fortum Värme, has increased the proportion of fuel from biofuel, 
but municipal planning documents describe it as technically difficult to fully convert the plant to 
biofuels (City of Stockholm, 2012). As a result, the coal plant becomes an immovable object that 
must be navigated around in order to achieve urban decarbonization goals:  
"Further reductions will occur when coal use at the Värtaverket power 
plant is cut in half during the coming 4-5 years. After that, we cannot 
count on significant reductions within district heating. Therefore, it is 
important that the City works ambitiously with energy efficiency 
throughout its property portfolio, and that traffic becomes more and 
more independent from fossil fuels."  
(City of Stockholm, 2012)  
Carbon largely becomes the problem of other actors (including individual citizens) to 
compensate for the continued pollution of the coal fired CHP plant in the pursuit of 
decarbonization goals. As participants in the research made clear, many feel it is unfair that a 
company continues to operate infrastructure that produces so much carbon pollution while the 
rest of the city is asked to decarbonize. 
However, this is not to say that entrenched interests in energy supply cannot be overcome. After 
over 10 years of contestation in San Francisco, a transition is taking place so that the municipally 
owned utility is now the default electric service provider (although the private utility still owns 
wires, billing and delivery). Decarbonization actors pursued this transition in order to work 
towards achieving a 100% renewable electricity by 2030 target. Rather than a simple issue of 




ballot multiple times and featured contentious negotiations (San Francisco environmental NGO 
employee, interview, Apr 19 2016). Nonetheless, CleanPowerSF began supplying customers in 
May 2016. 
5.5 The struggle to retrofit the existing built environment 
Decarbonization actors from across the three case studies struggle to retrofit the existing built 
environment to improve energy efficiency and to introduce low(er) carbon energy supply. While 
there is substantial progress in setting high standards for new buildings, urban actors struggle to 
address the challenges posed by the existing built environment. The materiality of the city 
seemed to resist change. This dynamic was repeated whether it referenced district energy 
(“When you walk around London and you think how would you put an 8 metre pipe down the 
road. We had enough trouble just putting in cable TV and that’s a tiny wire” [London 
development industry representative, interview, Sept 7 2015]); building retrofits and cultural 
values (“[London is] a very dense city, with a lot of historical buildings which you can’t touch” 
[London development industry representative, interview, Sept 15 2015]); building ownership 
structures (joint ownership in Stockholm where you own 10% of the building as an association 
member and technically rent your flat from the association where “people that are living in the 
house are elected to take care of everything during the year. And this is just ordinary 
people…They don't know so much about energy efficiency” [City of Stockholm environment 
administration employee, interview, Nov 28 2015]); or commercial buildings (“You try telling 
the developer ‘Hey, you’re forced to retrofit your building’ – see how far you get” [San 
Francisco consultant, interview, Apr 29 2016). These examples are just a few of the ways that 
material politics limit the application of low carbon retrofit solutions in the existing built form. 
There are two main dynamics at play in the struggle to retrofit the existing urban built 
environment. First, who should pay? Various approaches to financial loans and incentives have 
been developed to try to catalyze retrofits. Many efforts have targeted sectors of society 
described as people ‘able to pay’, such as loans to homeowners or information provision about 
cost-effective energy retrofits for large commercial buildings. The PACE program in San 




“Everyone recognizes the need to retrofit existing buildings for more 
efficiency and renewables and it seemed that there was a collective 
realization that capital to pay for these improvements was something 
that we need to focus on. PACE stands for property assessed clean 
energy… private property owners could basically opt in to use the 
program to fund energy efficiency and renewable energy projects on 
their properties and pay it back through their property taxes. It was a 
novel way to address a lot of the traditional barriers to provide capital 
for these types of projects.”  
(City of San Francisco environment department employee, interview, 
Apr 12 2016) 
In a few cases, efforts have targeted disadvantaged or marginalized actors, such as grants to 
citizens in environmental justice neighbourhoods to install solar panels in San Francisco or 
support for retrofits in the UK to counteract ‘fuel poverty’ where a household income is too low 
to keep a home warm at a reasonable cost. In general across the case studies, retrofits for 
decarbonization are approached as a material improvement to private property that, while 
supported by society, largely remains the financial responsibility of building owners.  
Second, who must decarbonize? Many building-energy decarbonization initiatives are focused 
on retrofitting private homes. Some initiatives have started to target large commercial buildings 
(e.g. San Francisco’s energy benchmarking and auditing program). Many initiatives target 
decarbonizing energy supply, but they encounter difficulties overcoming entrenched interests. 
Participants in the research recognized there were also significant challenges reaching large 
sectors of society. In particular, participants identified buildings that are rented to tenants and 
small businesses as especially problematic sectors that are only minimally targeted. As one 
research participant in London explained, one “sector that we’re not really doing any work 
with…is the small medium sized enterprises – very difficult group to interact with” (London 
borough (Croydon) employee, interview, Oct 5 2015). Furthermore, other than energy generation 
facilities, industry was almost universally absent as a target for decarbonization. By and large, 
the retrofit of the existing built environment has failed to reach large sectors of society to enable 
change. 
6. Implications for Decarbonization Pathways 
People are reconfiguring the urban materiality of Stockholm, London and San Francisco as they 




building-energy infrastructure begin to matter, including residential building envelopes, 
exceptionally low carbon neighbourhoods, and heat demand location. This process of making 
particular things matter is a political process since it highlights some aspects of building-energy 
infrastructure and not others in ways that represent particular interests (Rutherford, 2018). This 
section analyzes how what is being made to matter during the implementation of carbon 
governance impacts whether or not cities are on pathways toward decarbonization. I have 
grouped these implications around the themes of time, space and agency, which is one way to 
open up considerations of relational materiality. 
Time is a key factor influencing how urban decarbonization actors pursue building-energy 
transformations. In particular, different understandings of time impact whether actors can effect 
change that has the potential to lead to decarbonization. A short-term frame creates a different 
problem to be solved (e.g. relative decrease in greenhouse gas emissions) than a long-term 
decarbonization frame (e.g. energy transition), which brings different energy generation 
configurations to the fore as solutions. Depending on the timeframe, different material 
configurations appear to make sense as solutions, but these configurations are not necessarily 
reversible and have limited flexibility once they are implemented. New socio-material 
obduracies are created through building-energy infrastructure investments. This dynamic has 
implications for decarbonization because, as is clear in the London example, shorter timeframes 
can drive practices that support the more efficient use of fossil fuels rather than overcoming the 
entrenchment of fossil fuels to achieve transformation. In sum, when actors filter carbon 
governances through short timeframes, immediate greenhouse gas emission reduction can come 
to matter the most. However, the socio-material configurations of these solutions may set up a 
trajectory toward more efficient fossil fuel use rather than overcoming carbon lock-in. 
Furthermore, the evidence from the three cases also shows how targets that put a deadline on 
decarbonization can become normalized, which can allow decarbonization actors to shift the 
discussion to tangible acts of implementation and contestation. As others have found, targets nest 
together scientific and political elements to create normative pressure, including “affirm[ing] 
what is legitimate to reach, indicat[ing] the direction to be taken and provid[ing] the common 
language to translate priorities and programmes into a policy outcome” (Morseletto, Biermann, 




that urban decarbonization actors are actively leveraging these deadlines; some urban actors 
reinforced the inevitability of decarbonization in order to facilitate the implementation of carbon 
governance practices in current infrastructure development. Similarly, work on the sociology of 
expectations has found that actors actively reference what is possible in the future, which 
influences current technological development (van Lente, 2012). Urban actors are reinforcing 
expectations about the inevitability of future decarbonization in order to encourage or require the 
implementation of decarbonization today.  
Space is also a key factor influencing how urban decarbonization actors pursue building-energy 
transformations. In particular, spatial solutions for urban decarbonization have normative and 
performative power. Decarbonization actors are trying to enable the performance of 
decarbonization by following emerging configurations of low carbon districts or building-
oriented decarbonization. However, decarbonization actors sometimes positioned the spatial 
configuration itself as the solution to decarbonization (e.g. district energy is the solution) while 
other critical material elements are de-emphasized (e.g. natural gas fuel now, but it will transition 
to renewables ‘later’). This approach depoliticizes the materiality of decarbonization 
configurations to represent tangible, physical elements as interchangeable without 
acknowledging the ways that investment in particular configurations represents the establishment 
of power relations. Different spatial solutions for decarbonization foreground different socio-
material solutions, which has implications for whether or not successful decarbonization 
transitions are achieved. 
In addition, decarbonization actors felt they were required to justify carbon governance in 
relation to cost-effectiveness, despite the fact that cost-effectiveness metrics are often deeply 
intertwined with fossil fuel entrenchment. As a result, cost effectiveness can limit the broad 
application of low carbon transformation. However, local government decarbonization actors 
leveraged premium urban space to set higher decarbonization standards since the (perceived and 
actual) marginal cost of achieving those standards was more than offset by the gains. This 
exceptional decarbonization space in the city was spatially bounded and often in central 
commercial neighbourhoods because the flow of high levels of development capital was 
particularly essential to the strategy. Other literatures have also identified the potential of 




labs (Governance of Urban Sustainability Transitions & Urban Europe, 2017; Voytenko, 
McCormick, Evans, & Schliwa, 2016). Scholars have also noted the significant issues with 
viewing urban space as an experiment by reducing it to “a tabula rasa on which new 
technologies, transitional strategies, and other approaches can be tried and tested, and 
subsequently rolled out across wider scales” (Caprotti, 2014).  Despite the promising role of 
these niches, they bring up troubling questions about whether there is a growing dynamic of 
“accumulation by decarbonization” (Bumpus & Liverman, 2008) where privileged central urban 
spaces for the professional class and multinational commercial sector are disproportionately 
benefitting from decarbonization. If practices appropriate for exceptional urban space cannot 
make the leap to universal application, decarbonization may be another force of eco-
gentrification with concerning implications for uneven development. This finding connects to 
critical approaches to urban green re-development that have pointed out the “intensification of 
environmental and economic inequalities in the geographies of eco-urbanism” (Caprotti, 2014), 
contested the flattening of complex socio-natures for green building retrofit certification (Knuth, 
2015), critiqued the rise of “luxury ecologies” or urban environmental developments benefitting 
the professional class and related businesses (Cohen, 2017), and questioned configurations of 
moral and political responsibilities for urban climate action (Fuller, 2017) 
Finally, agency is a key factor influencing how urban decarbonization actors pursue building-
energy transformations. An emerging pattern in decarbonization practice is the individualization 
of decarbonization responsibility. Despite the large carbon impact of fossil fuel energy supply, 
the strength of entrenched interests makes many decarbonization efforts targeting this sector into 
drawn out negotiations (see also Blanchet (2015) and Monstadt & Wolff (2015)). When this 
dynamic takes place, utilities argue for the right to continue operating and collecting profit from 
high carbon assets while everyone else around them decarbonizes. Powerful entrenched interests 
make some aspects of building-energy infrastructure immovable (e.g. privately owned coal 
plant) and some movable (e.g. residential building fabric). Carbon then becomes a problem for 
homeowners and commercial building owners, usually alongside decarbonization of local 
government operations. The individualization of low carbon responsibility echoes the 
individualization of environmental subjectivity more broadly under neoliberalism (Brand, 2007). 
The unfairness of the dynamic is nonetheless clear; carbon becomes a problem for individuals to 




over structural levers of fossil fuel entrenchment wait as long as possible to act. Of course, 
emerging patterns of carbon governance are complex and the emphasis on individual 
responsibility runs alongside a logic of ‘leading by example’, where local governments 
decarbonize their own operations and assets. 
Decarbonization governance is also coalescing around patterns related to who should be 
responsible for paying for decarbonization. In particular, many building-energy decarbonization 
initiatives have framed carbon as a problem that should be solved through investments in private 
buildings and energy infrastructure. Within this frame, decarbonization actors have struggled 
with the implementation of retrofits to achieve decarbonization since the materiality of the city 
and related vested interests resist change. Furthermore, it was widely acknowledged by research 
participants that large sections of society are not being reached in efforts to decarbonize the 
existing built environment, including rented residential buildings and small and medium 
enterprises, which is a troubling challenge for urban actors committed to decarbonization.  
Overall, there are important implications for the directions these cities are headed. When 
decarbonization actors adopt a long-term decarbonization framework (as opposed to short term 
logic of marginal improvement), it can drive building-energy infrastructure investments that may 
overcome fossil fuels. New urban space is moving towards decarbonization despite variations in 
the spatial configurations and specific imaginaries about what that might mean for urban futures 
(e.g. zero carbon, net zero energy etc.). In particular, decarbonization actors’ efforts to harness 
the exceptional nature of the urban, particularly related to real estate value for new 
developments, show some potential to overcome the tyranny of cost-effectiveness in maintaining 
the status quo. However, upgrades to existing buildings are limited in scope. The socio-material 
obduracy of the built environment has required decarbonization actors to develop finely detailed 
policy customization based on building type, ownership, willingness/ability to pay, and yet 
participants in the research still identified significant struggle across the urban three case studies. 
The material politics of building-energy retrofit for decarbonization are proving particularly 
troublesome and retrofit of the existing built environment is proceeding too slowly to meet long-
term decarbonization goals. Finally, there has been some success in decarbonizing energy 
supply, although the interests entrenched in the socio-material energy system are difficult for 




This paper has also identified a number of concerns based on patterns of decarbonization 
practice. In particular, I argue that it is unjust to overemphasize individual responsibility for 
decarbonization as opposed to overcoming fossil fuel interests and achieving structural change in 
building and energy systems. Furthermore, large swaths of society (particularly the rental 
market, small and medium enterprises, and industry) remain hard to reach in efforts to transform 
the existing built environment. Finally, uneven low carbon development and retrofit through 
spatially bounded demonstration sites or eco-districts threatens to drive eco-gentrification. It is 
necessary to find pathways from exceptional urban space to ordinary applications. 
7. Conclusion  
Urban low carbon transitions suggest a substantial re-ordering of urban infrastructure. However, 
research so far has largely painted a picture of incremental ambitions that have faced struggles in 
implementation, which means there is a critical need to engage with the material implications of 
low carbon practices. Here, I have focused on three urban case studies where actors are aiming 
for transformation in order to provide a novel deepening of our understanding of implemented 
urban carbon governance. By applying a material politics approach, I examined patterns in what 
is being made to matter through the translation of carbon governance into building-energy 
infrastructure. Decarbonization pathways will differ across the case studies, influenced by factors 
such as different climates, governance contexts, and existing built environments, but this paper 
has examined commonalities across the cases in order to generate conceptual insights into urban 
decarbonization practices. 
Emerging patterns in urban decarbonization practices carry implications for whether or not cities 
are on trajectories toward decarbonization. The paper found that a short-term decision making 
timeline (e.g. 2020 or 2030) encourages action that incrementally reduces greenhouse gas 
emissions without fundamentally overcoming carbon lock-in, but that the long-term timeline 
(e.g. 2050) creates different problems and solutions that can engender decarbonization 
trajectories. The paper also found that different socio-material solutions are foregrounded when 
actors focus on different spatial solutions for decarbonization, which has implications for 
whether or not successful decarbonization trajectories are achieved. Furthermore, actors are 
harnessing exceptional urban space to overcome the tyranny of cost-effectiveness in maintaining 




implications for justice and uneven development. In addition, there is a pattern of 
individualization of responsibility for decarbonization, which allows powerful agents in industry 
continue to operate high carbon assets and maintain political and technological carbon lock-in. 
Finally, material politics limit the application of low carbon retrofit solutions in the existing built 
form, which will significantly impede urban decarbonization efforts given that the majority of 
urban buildings in the cases are expected to remain standing in 2050. 
A material politics approach to urban decarbonization offers a way to conceptually capture the 
messy, materially embedded and contested nature of infrastructure transformations. 
Decarbonization is recast as an inherently political and on-going process of assembling together 
various human and non-human elements. In general, acknowledging infrastructure as messy and 
contested can make it seem difficult to change. Instead, this application of a material politics 
approach demonstrated how opening up our understanding of decarbonization pathways beyond 
technological choices actually reveals many potential leverage points in urban systems to spur 
decarbonization. 
Decarbonization experiences in cities vary and it is important to broadly consider stories of 
transformation. This paper has specifically focused on wealthy cities in industrialized nations 
that bear the bulk of the responsibility for historical greenhouse gas emissions and it is critical 
that future research also theorizes and empirically examines low carbon development in the 
urban global South. Future research can also delve more deeply into the patterns identified in this 
paper. In particular, research can continue to explore the tension between leveraging the urban as 
exceptional space and the dynamics of eco-gentrification, the political economies of energy 
utilities in the context of low-carbon transitions, and ways to overcome the obduracy of the built 
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